What are ransomware attacks and how do they work – SPE

Ransomware cyber attacks are an important category of cyber threats that target digital and cyber-physical systems and rely on data availability and system integrity. In PV environments, where continuous monitoring and control are required, ransomware can seriously impact operational continuity by denying access to essential systems and information.

These attacks involve malicious software that infiltrates a system, encrypts files or entire platforms, and demands payment, often in cryptocurrency, in exchange for restoring access. Unlike denial-of-service attacks that overwhelm systems or credential attacks that silently infiltrate them, ransomware locks operators out directly from their own infrastructure. As a result, operators may lose visibility and control over PV assets and associated data.

Ransomware attacks can target PV systems and solar power plants by compromising monitoring platforms, SCADA systems, engineering workstations or cloud-based management tools. Once deployed, the malware can spread across connected components, encrypting operational data, historical performance data, and configuration settings. In some cases, attackers also exfiltrate sensitive data before encrypting it, increasing pressure by threatening disclosure.

These attacks can also indirectly cause physical and operational risks by preventing timely control actions or error detection. Inverters, transformers and network interfaces can continue to operate without proper supervision, potentially leading to inefficiency, instability or safety risks. Furthermore, ransomware incidents can result in extended downtime, financial losses and costly recovery processes.

“Ransomware attacks are a major and growing problem. In 2025 alone, cybercriminals generated more than €800 million ($941 million) from successful attacks, according to Chainalysis, a US-based blockchain analytics company. In the PV industry, a ransom attack has the power to ‘lock’ a solar power plant’s ability to export power. This will cause an immediate and ongoing loss of revenue until the ransom is paid.” Uri Sadot, Managing Director of SolarDefend and Chair of the Digitalization Workstream of SolarPower Europe, said pv magazine.

Operational modes

Ransomware attacks can occur via different infection vectors and execution methods. Common entry points include phishing emails with malicious attachments, compromised remote access services, software vulnerabilities, or supply chain compromises. Once inside, the ransomware can execute immediately or lie dormant as it spreads laterally across the network.

For PV systems, a ransomware attack often begins with an attacker initially gaining access to an internal network, either through compromised credentials or by exploiting vulnerabilities in Internet-facing systems. From there, the attacker can escalate privileges from low access to high control within the system, or move laterally to critical components such as SCADA servers or monitoring platforms, and deploy the ransomware payload to multiple systems simultaneously.

Common techniques in PV environments include encrypting databases used for performance monitoring, locking down operator interfaces, and disabling backup systems to prevent easy recovery. In distributed solar farms, attackers can target centralized management platforms, affecting multiple locations simultaneously and increasing operational impact.

Once the attack is activated, operators may suddenly lose access to systems, encounter ransom notes, or see files rendered unusable. At this stage, the attack is fully active and recovery becomes complex, often requiring system recovery, forensics, and coordination with cybersecurity experts. In severe cases, manual control or complete shutdown of affected systems may be necessary.

Defense

One possible defense against ransomware attacks in PV systems is to implement robust backup strategies, which ensure that critical data and system configurations can be restored without paying a ransom. Backups should be stored securely, updated regularly, and isolated from the main network to avoid compromise.

Network segmentation is another important defense, limiting ransomware’s ability to spread across systems. By isolating critical components such as inverters, SCADA systems and monitoring platforms, operators can limit infections and reduce overall impact.

Endpoint security tools and regular software updates can help prevent malware from running by detecting known threats and patching vulnerabilities. Additionally, limiting administrative rights and implementing an application whitelist can reduce the attack surface.

Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) and security monitoring tools can identify early signs of ransomware activity, such as unusual file encryption behavior or unauthorized access attempts. Combined with automated response mechanisms, these tools can help contain attacks before they fully spread.

Training user awareness is also essential, as phishing remains one of the most common entry points for ransomware. Training staff to recognize suspicious emails and follow safe practices can significantly reduce risk.

In summary, ransomware attacks pose a serious risk to PV systems, mainly affecting data availability, operational continuity and financial stability. By keeping operators out of critical systems, these attacks can halt operations and create cascading effects on interconnected infrastructure.

While measures such as secure backups, segmentation, endpoint protection, monitoring and user training can reduce the risk, no solution can completely prevent ransomware incidents. Systems should be designed with layered defenses, continuous monitoring and well-defined incident response plans.

This approach not only ensures rapid recovery from attacks, but also limits the attacker’s ability to spread, propagate, or cause long-term disruption to PV installations.

“The impact of ransomware on victims is extremely difficult to oversee,” Sadot concludes. “If you don’t pay the ransom, you suffer losses. If you do pay the ransom, you encourage future attacks. Not an easy dilemma. And for us in the PV industry, there’s added complexity. If a large company decides not to pay, massive power outages could result. Can anyone really afford that?”